ABSTRACT The rise of the smart grid, which applies the Internet and smart metering technologies to the power system, results in massive, heterogeneous power data and a large number of attacks on the smart grid and causes great threats to the confidentiality and integrity of the power data. At the same time, with the development of quantum information, it is possible to use quantum cryptography to protect data transmission. Aiming at the problem of data security transmission in smart grid, this paper proposes a lightweight transmission scheme for power data security. In the scheme, we combine quantum cryptography with "one-time pad" mechanism, use a quantum random number generator which compensates the defects of the traditional random number generator and quantum key distribution protocol which ensure the security of key distribution, and design a new lightweight stream cipher encryption algorithm. Through theoretical analysis and experiments, it is proved that the proposed transmission scheme can ensure the security of power data transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an Emerging Technology, the smart grid which combined with the advanced information communication technology (ICT) provides an effective means for integrating various renewable energy sources into existing power systems, and realizes a reliable, safe, economic, efficient and environmentally friendly power system. Intelligent communications technologies and information processing technologies have penetrated all aspects of power energy systems, such as generation, transmission, distribution, and home appliances [1] , [2] . The widespread use of advanced information and communication technologies, particularly smart metering technology, generates vast amounts of electricity data. On the one hand, these data bring great benefits to better energy planning, more efficient energy generation and distribution. On the other hand, these can increase the stability and reliability of the smart grid. However, these technologies have also brought new security problems. Due to the coexistence of traditional SCADA with advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and information technology (IT) systems, the interoperation of the data needs to call application programming interface (API), thus exposing the grid to cyber-attacks, such as meta-data spoofing, wrapping, Dos and phishing [3] . These attacks would affect the stability of the operation of the power system and may even cause widespread power outages, leading huge losses to the national economy and adversely influence to the social environment. Hence, a new technology is urgently needed to ensure the security of data transmission in the smart grid.
To ensure the security of communication in power system, the relevant security organizations considered the security requirements and traffic restrictions, recommended the cryptographic algorithms widely used in the IT network, and introduced a series of user guides and security standards, such as IEC 62351, ANSI/ISA-99.02. 01-2009, AGA-12, to guide the companies to utilize encryption and authentication to ensure the communication security of power system [4] , [5] . AGA-12 and IEC 62351 used RSA, elliptic curve (ECC) [6] or other classical asymmetric encryption algorithms to protect the power data. However, the speed of these algorithms was limited by the performance of power system and the power data increases exponentially, they did not meet the high real-time. To handle the problem which traditional TCP/IPbased network infrastructure didn't meet Industrial Internet of things (IIoTs), Premnath et al. [7] used the lightweight NTRU encryption to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of power data in the SCADA system. However, NTRU did not provide a complete system of decryption, there has some legal cipher text cannot be decrypted, so it wasn't suitable for power system. Although lightweight encryption algorithm achieved low power consumption and hardware costs, to some extent they affected the performance of the power system. In addition, key management, including key generation and distribution, is important for the security of data transmission in smart grids [8] - [10] . Tsai and Lo [8] utilize an identity-based signature scheme and an identity-based encryption scheme to propose a new anonymous key distribution scheme for smart grid. Odelu et al. [9] consider the Canetti-Krawczyk adversary model and proposes a new efficient provably secure authenticated key agreement scheme for smart grid. Saxena and Grijalva [10] proposed a scheme with dynamic key distribution and secret key updating, which can generate a series of dynamic secrets on the communication network to generating keys for data encryption. However, most of these schemes are based on computationally expensive public-key cryptography which is impractical for the resource constrained smart meters.
In addition, the above communication schemes use the classical encryption and authentication algorithm. However, with the development of quantum computing, quantum computer poses a huge threat to the security of classic cryptography which used in power system. Shor's quantum algorithm solves the factorization problem of large integers and discrete logarithms in polynomial time. Grover's search algorithm allows for secondary acceleration when calculating the inverse hash function. Due to the further development of quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution technology is increasingly mature, and has risen from theory to practical. Considering the demands of power system for communication security, more and more researches are devoted to the application of quantum cryptography in the communication of power data to cope with the threat posed by quantum computers [11] - [15] . Zhou et al. [12] combined the quantum key distribution (QKD) system with the power vertical encryption authentication system to ensure the security of the communication. Xin and Xi [14] unified plaintext, ciphertext and key into a standard E1 interface signal, make the QKD to meet requirements of ''one-time pad'' (OTP) [15] . The channel in power system is not always ideal, Sharma et al. [16] verified that in collective noises environment the entangledstate-based protocols (such as ping-pong protocol) perform better than the single-qubit-based protocols. Naser [17] proposed a quantum authentication scheme based on entanglement swapping, completing authentication and communication tasks. Zawadzki et al. [18] improved the security of ping-pong protocol by using mutually unbiased basis in control mode. Yuan et al. [19] proposed quantum identity authentication based on ping-pong technique without entanglement to verify the legitimate user's identity and update the initial authentication key. To solve the problem of security of key in OTP, a new branch of quantum cryptography had emerged: quantum random number generators (QRNGs) [20] - [22] . Nikša Tadiá et al. [22] introduced a laser diode current with time dependence in 0.35-µm BiCMOS technology and could be used in optical QRNGs which used as the key generator in OTP.
In conclusion, the communication schemes proposed above for protecting data transmission of a power system has an expensive cost. At the same time, in the face of quantum computers, the integrity and confidentiality of power data cannot be well protected. Considering these factors, we introduce quantum key distribution protocol to improve the security of smart grid and propose a lightweight quantum cryptography scheme for power system. The scheme adopts the OTP mechanism and uses quantum cryptography to repair the defects in key generation and distribution in the classic stream cipher and realizes the secure transmission of power data.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) The QRNG generated session key is applied to OTP, which enhances the confidentiality of the transmitted data. (2) We designed an authentication algorithm and introduced it into the key distribution protocol. (3) The security analysis and experiments prove that this encryption method is more suitable for power system.
The rest paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the combination of quantum cryptography and ''vertical encryption authentication'' system in the smart grid is introduced. In Section 3, the proposed communication scheme is described detailed. In Section 4, a series of theoretical analysis and experiments are carried out. In Section 5, conclusions are given.
II. QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR SMART GRID
The power secondary system is a vital part in smart grid which can ensure the security of the closed-loop monitoring system and the dispatch network. In order to ensure the reliability of the secondary power system, it is divided into three layers: control management layer, network communication layer, and field device layer. The network communication layer usually uses classical symmetric key to authentication and secure power data. In this paper, we use the quantum key instead of classical key to realize data encryption and authentication, as shown in Fig.1 . The red line is a classical channel, while the blue line is a quantum channel, CA is communication agent.
Due to the differences between quantum key distribution system and power communication network, the system needs to add QKD session management module to connect QKD terminal and specific power equipment, such as data collector, to achieve the purpose of key distribution, identity authentication and message exchange. The system uses optical fiber channel as quantum channel to transmit qubit and key generation control system to control the generation and distribution of quantum key.
III. DATA SECURITY TRANSMISSION BASED ON QUANTUM ENCRYPTION A. SECURITY TRANSMISSION SCHEME FOR POWER DATA
In this section, we describe a communication scheme based on quantum encryption, which is used to secure the transmission of power data. In the scheme, we consider communication parties have a common secret S to each other which only known by both parties. S contains the identity information of both and is compiled into a binary. We combine OTP with quantum cryptography and use the QKD terminal to generate and distribute key. During the data transmission, the session key is generated by the QRNG in the QKD terminal and distributed by QKD protocol through the quantum channel, each key only is used once. And the identity authentication on both parties is based on S which is updated by session key. Assume that communication parties are Alice and Bob, the scheme is showed in Fig. 2 .
The scheme consists of three processes: authentication, key distribution, data transmission. Since the quantum key distribution system is a transceiver split equipment, Alice and Bob each have their own a QKD terminal. The process is as follows:
1. As the communication requester, Bob sends a request to QKD Bob .
2. After QKD Bob accepts the request, it requests the secret S of Alice and Bob from key control system. 3. Key control system sends S to QKD Bob . QKD Bob generates the initial key and appends S, the ID of Bob to the end of it as the session key, then sends to Alice and Bob through quantum key distribution protocol.
4. QKD Alice accepts the key and get the ID of Bob, then requests the secret S of Alice and Bob from key control system.
5. QKD Alice accepts the S from control system, and compares the two S. If they are different, QKD Alice rejects this communication. If same, then QKD Alice sends session key to Alice 6. After Alice gets the session key, they can send messages to each other through the classical channel.
7. When communication over, use the session key to update S.
B. PREPARATION PHASE
In this section, we describe preparation phase of the proposed security transmission scheme, including key generation and distribution. Due to adopt the OTP mechanism, our scheme uses the QRNG and QKD protocol to generate and distribute session key.
1) SESSION KEY GENERATION
In the OTP mechanism, the quality of the session key determines directly the security of the communication. The quality of the random number generated by the traditional random number generator depends on the seed, and it has the defect of long-period correlation and may not pass the local randomness test. Considering these factors, we use the QRNG based on the photon arrival time to generate random number, which is shown in Fig. 3 .
The seed of the random number generator is the arrival time t i of the photons which is related to T. It is known that the process of the generation of photons by a radiated semiconductor is Poisson process. We assume that the LD can generate a continuous and stable coherent light source, the probability that the number of photons falling in the time interval (τ, τ + T ) is k is given by:
where λ is the average number of the photon per unit time. Due to the number of incident photons obeys Poisson distribution, and if there is only one arrival photon in the time interval (τ, τ + T ), the arrival time is evenly distributed. Therefore, we consider that only a single photon arrives in the fixed length of time interval T and calculate the photon arrival time t i related to T. By the conditional probability, photon arrival time can be demonstrated to be uniform:
where N(T) represents the number of photons that occur in the time interval T, P (τ ≤ t ≤ t i , N (T ) = 1) is joint probability that a photon arriving in the (τ, t i ) and none in the (t i , τ + T ).
After the photons are passed through the attenuator, they are detected by a silicon single-photon avalanche diode. Because of the attenuator, the N (T ) > 0 measured by SPAD, instead of N (T ) = 1. However, under the condition of the small values of λ, the possibility of more than one arrival photon negligible. By the time, the probability of photon arrival
. The above conditional probability Eq. (2) is valid.
The original random data which quantized from the perturbation signal has a certain degree of bias. We use the Toeplitz matrix algorithm based on the Fast Fourier Transform to extract the randomness. The process is as follow:
where
T , the complexity is O n 2 .
2) QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOL
As an important protocol in QKD, ping-pong protocol uses the Bell state + as a carrier for transmitting information, which can be used for key distribution. According to the entanglement characteristics of quantum, both parties involved in communication can extract information from the entangled state only if they possess simultaneously all the entangled state particles.
Assuming the two communication parties are Alice and Bob, then the process is shown as follow. Bob prepares the maximum entangled photon pair according to the number, one of the pairs denotes as ''home'' photon which keeps the confidential and is stored in the local, while the other is ''travel'' photon which is send to Alice. Alice enters the message and control mode with a certain probability respectively. When entering the message mode, Alice receives the particles and selects randomly one unitary operation from I A and σ A to encode all the information in A, where I A is the unit operator, without any operation, representing the classical bit 0, and σ A is the phase flip, flip the phase of | A , representing the classical bit 1. After encoding, Alice sends the particle sequence back to Bob. The ping-pong protocol is shown in Fig. 4 .
The two communication parties can switch the two modes by the protocol. Control mode is used to detect the existence of eavesdroppers in the channel. According to Bell state, the results of the measure results of qubits by Bob and Alice are reversed under ideal channel condition. Any deviation from that correlation indicates the presence of Eve. However, it is known the security of ping-pong protocol depends that the travel qubit remains always in the maximally mixed state, has nothing to do with the encoding of Alice. When Eve eavesdrops, he prepares two probes x and y in the state 2 x | 0 y , where | 2 is the vacuum state. After Bob receives the encoding quantum sequence returned by Alice, Eve makes the probes interact before and after encoding and extract some information about the encoding. It is proved by theory that the mutual information between Eve and Alice is the same as that between Alice and Bob. Therefore, we introduce the identity authentication into the protocol to ensure that the both parties are legal communicators.
3) IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION
According to the above QKD process, there is no identity authentication performed during the communication. In order to remedy the defect, this work uses the secret S shared by the Alice and Bob for identity authentication. The S is used to generate an authentication sequence and append at the end of the key. In addition, considering the noise and loss in quantum channel, we also append the check-code.
Suppose that the key generated by QRNG is
, then authentication sequence L which generate by the XOR of K and S is:
where we stipulate that if s 1 = 0, then k 0 = 1, otherwise k 0 = 0. Append L to the end of K and generate check code r k and r L of K and L respectively by the horizontal odd parity. Then append r k and r L to the end of it to get the sequence K ||L||r K ||r L . According to sequence, Bob sets the polarization direction of the photons and sends to Alice. Alice receives and chooses the measuring basis at random to measure the sequence and analyzes the results to judge whether the opponent is legal. If legal, communication is continuing, otherwise reject. The process is shown in Fig. 5 .
Since only legitimate communicators know the secret S and measurement base, so it can verify the identity of both parties through the above process. In order to ensure the absolute security of identity authentication, after data communication is completed, the key generation control system uses the session key K to update S:
Therefore, each S is used only once to resist the impersonation attack. At the same time, the introduction of the check code can reduce the rejection of communication caused by the channel noise to a certain extent. The measured sequence is decomposed into four parts: K, L, r k , r L . Use S to recover 
where we stipulate that if
If there is a difference between K and K, analysis the check code, and when there is only one error in the specified sequence, the communication is accepted. Therefore, communication is allowed when:
1. r k matches with the key sequence, r L doesn't and compared with K the K has only two different bits, which is no error occurs in the key and one error in the L.
2. r L matches with the key sequence, r k doesn't and compared with K the K has only one different bit, which is one error occurs in the key and no error in the L.
C. COMMUNICATION PHASE 1) LIGHTWAIGHT CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM DESIGN
The OTP mechanism we used requires the length of the ciphertext, plaintext and key must be the same. Considering the performance of algorithm and the requirement of power system, our paper designs a stream cipher algorithm which is shown in Algorithm 1.
It is worth to certain that the length of the plaintext is variable. So it needs to be divided into sequences whose length is same as key's. According to the first bit of S, the permutation matrix and k 0 are generated. There are two permutations and a diffusion in our algorithm which can make the encryption results as complicated as possible.
2) PROCESS OF DATA ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION
According to the encryption algorithm described in the previous section the data encryption process is as follows:
1. QRNG generates the session key
2. Plaintext M has p bit, and divides into n-bit data segment. If the length of last segment less than n, it would be filled with zero;
3. Construct the permutation matrix s according to the ascending order of S. If the first bit in S is zero, the final permutation matrix VIST is s and the value of k 0 is one, otherwise matrix VIST is the s −1 and k 0 is zero; 4. Permute M according to VIST to get m; 5. Encryption: if i = 1, then
[6. Permutation: permute P according to VIST to get C. The process of decryption is: 1. Permutation: reverse permute C according to VIST to get P. 2. Decryption:
3. Permutation: reverse permute m according to VIST to get M;
4. Remove the extra 0 in M to get the final plaintext;
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISONS

A. RONDOMNESS ANALYSIS OF KEY
Considering that in actual use, the detection efficiency of silicon single-photon avalanche diode (Si-SPAD) is not ideal, and it is affected by the dead time, jitter, dark counts and the light during avalanche after the light pulse. The above factors will affect our Poisson statistics on photons and will ultimately affect the quality of the random numbers. Autocorrelation analysis of the detector Si-SPAD gives the signal distribution after the light pulse and the dead time of the diode. The autocorrelation coefficient is calculated as:
where X i , X T represent the detection signal of two moments when t = t i and t = τ + T . From (7) shows that the autocorrelation can't be ignored, that detection efficiency η < 1. Otherwise the detector has a count rate of 13.9Mcps, dead time of 45ns and dark counts occur at 100 to 500 times per second, which is about 15cps. Therefore, compared with the detection of photon flux, it is almost impossible for the dark counts, and the noise impact caused by the dark counts is negligible. Photon detection still follows the Poisson distribution. According to the analysis, (1) is revised as:
At the same time, multiphoton events will occur because the detected light source is attenuated continuous light. It is assumed that K photons appear in the time interval (τ, τ + T), and when the detector detects the first photon, it is inactivated immediately, that is, the dead time. Therefore, photons arriving in dead time will be discarded. In order to ensure that the detection event in each cycle is not greater than 1, the external reference period T we chose should be less than the detector dead time ensuring the stability and quality of random numbers.
In addition, the randomness of the sequence is quantified by minimum entropy, it is defined as follows:
According to the above analysis, only the first photon is detected in the k photons reached in the interval (τ, τ + T), that is, the probability P (n = 1|k) is the largest. The value of P 1 is:
So the minimum entropy is:
As can be seen from (10) and (11), the value of minimum entropy H ∞ depends on average photon number λ, external reference period T and Si-SPAD detection efficiency η. The above three parameters are related to the detector count rate C and dead time t d :
Therefore, the minimum entropy H ∞ is in the range of:
According to (13) , we can figure out that H ∞ is determined by the count rate of the single photon detector. From the perspective of autocorrelation and minimum entropy, we analyze the randomness of the sequences generated by QRNG. The analysis results show that each bit of the random sequence contains enough information and has good randomness, both have passed the dieharder test and the NIST test procedure.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PROTOCOL
According to the proposed scheme, the data collector performs the operation of the secret S and session key to generate the authentication sequence L, the sends the L and session key to the data service center. After receiving the message, the data service center parses out S and compares it with the stored S to determine whether the source of the information is credible.
In the preparation phase, the data collection terminal C1 initiates a communication request, and its QKD terminal requests the key service center to send the secret S shared between C1 and the data service center. Key service center sends the S to C1 and data service center. C1 and data service center transform S into the measurement bases sequence
, for example, classic bit 0 corresponds to σ z base and 1 corresponds to σ x base. In addition, the measurement base used to obtain the session key is M which adopted in the EPR protocol. In scheme, C1 prepares entangled particle pairs according to the authentication sequence L:
and sends the B particle to the data service center. According to protocol, C1 randomly selects the M to measure the A particle, data service center randomly selects M or M L to measure B particle and send part of the results from the measurement basis M L to C1. C1 uses Bell theory to detect whether there is an eavesdropper. Data service center transforms the measurement result
classical quantum bit sequence L and calculates L according to the algorithm, the compares them to determine whether C1 is a legitimate communicator or not. If it is legal, data service center uses session K encrypt L and the corresponding sequence numbers N i to get C = E k L , N i , send C to C1 via the classical channel. C1 decrypt C to get L and N i , then compares with its own measurement results to determine if the data service center is legal. Due to the two authentications, the attacker must know the shared secret S and the measurement results of the data center at the same time. However, this is very difficult. Therefore, the proposed scheme can effectively resist man-in-the-middle attacks.
C. PEFORMANCE COMPARSION OF SCHEME
In this section, we compare the proposed scheme with related smart grid communication schemes. The comparison includes security attributes and encryption algorithm performance.
The comparison of security attributes is shown in TABLE 1. It can be seen from the table that most communication schemes perform poorly in ensuring the security of session key and physical security of the data collectors and cannot resist the attack of the quantum computer. The security of session key determines the reliability of the power data. If the physical security of the data collector cannot be guaranteed, it may lead to the internal attacks on the collector. For quantum computer attacks, classical encryption algorithms, such as ECC-based and symmetric cryptographic algorithms, cannot resist. The proposed scheme uses quantum cryptography and the security of the session key does not depend on the computational complexity, it could resist the attack of quantum computers. And the OTP mechanism guarantees that each key is used only once, and the quantum key distribution protocol secure the distribution of the session key, so the replay and eavesdropping attacks invalid. Meanwhile, the authentication based on the S is bidirectional and S is updated after each communication, so it is difficult for the man-in-the-middle attack. Therefore, the proposed scheme can secure the transmission of power data.
It can be seen from the above analysis that the identity authentication scheme can resist the man-in-the-middle attack and ensure the security and traceability of key distribution. For the encryption algorithm, the security of the key determines the security of the proposed encryption algorithm. Therefore, this part compares the performance of Algorithm 1 with the other three classic encryption algorithms.
We analyze four encryption algorithms on a 64-bit PC with win10 and Inter7 Core processor i7-3612QM. We select five different sets of keys and plaintexts during the experiment, and the experimental result is the average value. The key length of the DES is 64 bits (including the 8-bit check digit), VOLUME 7, 2019 the key length of the AES is 256 bits, and the key length of RC4 and the encryption algorithm proposed in this paper is 256 bits. The keys and plaintexts are generated by the random function to avoid the contingency from artificially generated data.
Count the running time of the four algorithms to obtain the time taken for the whole cycle from the calling to the running, as shown in Figure 6 . As can be seen from the figure, the classical symmetric encryption algorithms DES and AES grow linearly with the increase of the plaintext length, and the time of AES is shorter than DES. And the time of the stream cipher algorithm under different plaintext lengths is generally stable between 0.15 and 0.2. In summary, compared with the classic encryption algorithm, the stream encryption algorithm proposed has lowest cost of time.
Statistics four algorithms occupied memory during the lifetime, including the temporary memory, as shown in Figure 7 . It can be seen from the figure that the occupied memory of the four algorithms shows a linear growth. Among them, the memory required for the RC4 algorithm is the largest, followed by the DES algorithm and the smallest AES algorithm, and the algorithm we propose is between the DES and the AES.
According to the relationship between the time cost and the space cost of the algorithm, if you reduce the time complexity, you must pay for the space, and vice versa. For an algorithm, you cannot have both. As shown in the experimental results, the cost of AES algorithm is the least, but the time cost is the hugest. The RC4 algorithm has the hugest space cost, the lower time cost, and the DES is between AES and RC4. The algorithm proposed in this paper has the lowest time cost and intermediate-level space cost. Compared with the above three encryption algorithms, our algorithm has achieved the best comprehensive time performance and spatial performance.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a scheme of secure transmission of power big data based on lightweight quantum cryptography, which realizes the application of quantum cryptography in power environment. The quantum key generator and key distribution protocol are used to improve the communication mode of traditional power system and the key space in big data environment. This scheme is also applicable to other scenarios where it is necessary to protect the transmitted data. However, our proposed scheme can guarantee the security of key distribution, but the process is complicated. At present, there are still many problems to be solved in the practical application of quantum cryptography. In the future, we will simplify the process of key distribution and further improve real-time performance on the premise of ensuring the security of keys.
